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ers. 6 In reviewing the causes and contents of last year's continuing resolution, this article will not altogether remove the negative cast put on continuing resolutions. 7 At the same time, this article will pay attention to those features in the existing budget process that make continuing resolutions inevitable and somewhat beneficial. 8 It will also explore whether omnibus legislation subverts the President's veto power 9 and whether some notion of "due process in lawmaking" demands that lawmakers have an opportunity to read and debate a bill before they vote on it. 1° Finally, this article will consider this type of single-year legislation's propensity to raise bill of attainder and equal protection problems. 11 I. CONTINUING REsOLUTIONS: WHY, How AND WHAT'S WRONG?
The awesome dimensions of the FY 88 continuing resolution have provoked a firestorm of criticism both inside 12 and outsidel 3 Congress. The resolution's alleged failings include: (1) changing the balance of power within Congress, 14 (2) undermining the President's veto, ts (3) en-456. 16. Critics of the continuing resolution claim that it is a ripe target for the inclusion of "pork barrel" projects. The Appropriations Committee's willingness to include amendments to ensure approval, combined with limitations on debate and amendment, explains this phenomenon. CoMMIT-TEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 14, at 38-39. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of such pork barrel projects is subject to attack. In his 1988 State of the Union Address, for example, President Reagan chastised Congress for the continuing resolution's inclusion of such projects as "cranberry research, the study of crawfish and the commercialization of 17. See generally infra notes 48-72. In this counection, concern has also been voiced about disruption of the legislative process. Typifying these remarks, Congressman Butler Derrick warned in 1984:
Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
[W]e cannot continue to operate around here in a manner which ignores the normal legislative process-in which all our real work is done on appropriatiou bills and, in particular, on the continuing resolution. It is not fair to the authorizing committees which see their work go down the drain as all attention is focused on the appropriation bills • . . it is damaging to the integrity of the legislative process. 130 CoNG. REC. H9895 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984) . [Vol. 1988:389 These allegations have led Democrats and Republicans alike to condemn continuing resolutions. 18 Yet, a confluence of phenomena make continued use of this funding mechanism likely.
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A. The Emergence of Continuing Resolutions.
Congress passed the first continuing resolution in 1876, providing funding for certain government accounts for ten days. 19 Since 1954, Congress has passed at least one continuing resolution each year. 20 Until 1981, continuing resolutions were confined to interim spending measures.21 Since then, however, the use, scope and size of these measures has dramatically expanded. 22 Today, continuing resolutions provide fullyear funding for many (and sometimes all) federal operations 23 and serve as a repository of uurelated legislation. 24 While the appropriations process 25 has always served as a last opContinuing resolutions are also problematic because they disrupt normal government operations. Federal employees left in the dark about their agency's funding frequently abandon "appro- [pre-1981] continuing resolutions: (1) a fixed duration (ten days) and (2) a maximum level of funding ('proportional' for the ten-day period to the appropriations made available the previous year)." R. KEITH, supra note 14, at 7. For an overview of pre-1981 practices, see id. at 7-11.
20. See R. KEITH, supra note 14, at 8; see also UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-FICE, CONTINUING REsOLUTIONS AND AN AssESSMENT OF AUTOMATIC FUNDING APPROACHES 14-24 (1986) [hereinafter GAO].
21. As such they were fairly simple, providing funding for a short period of time, normally less than three months, at a rate of spending usually defined as the lower of the previous year's rate, the President's rate, or the rate in the House-or Senate-passed appropriation. CoMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 14, at 34; see also L. FisHER, supra note 1, at 143-46 (describing complexities in determining the appropriate rate).
22. According to the GAO, from 1960 to 1985, "the amount of detail and the resulting number of pages in continuing resolutions increased at least a hundredfold." See GAO [Vol. 1988:389 recommendations. 32 The President was supposed to be responsible for overall budget aggregates, with Congress retaining the right to set priorities within those aggregates. 33 Presidential impoundments disrupted this balance. By withholding appropriations, the President sought to control aggregates and priorities.
The Budget Act contained a number of provisions designed to strengthen congressional control over fiscal affairs. Under the Act, presidential rescissions of appropriated funds require approval by both the Senate and House. 34 The President could defer the spending of funds, subject to a one-house veto. 35 The Act also created Budget Committees in the House and Senate, 3 6 established a Congressional Budget Office to supply technical support,3 7 and required the adoption of budget resolutions to set overall limits on budget aggregates (such as total outlays and revenues) and permit debate on spending priorities. 38 Since 1974, Congress, in formulating its budget resolution, has often applied policy, economic and technical assumptions different from those presented in the executive budget.39
The principle consequence of this transformation proved to be fiscal irresponsibility. The 1974 Act hinged on a centralized process (the budget resolution). Congress, unlike the quintessentially centralized Executive, is strongly decentralized. Consequently, as Louis Fisher has observed, "[i]nstead of staying within the President's aggregates, Members of Congress could vote on generous ceilings in a budget resolution and then announce to their constituents that they had 'stayed within the budget. ' to accommodate policy preferences, submitted unrealistic budgets to Congress.
By 1985, budget deficits were so outrageous that Congress felt compelled to act. Its solution was the peculiar Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act. Gramm-Rudman represents something of a hybrid. In enacting it, Congress was no longer willing to trust its internal budgetary process, yet it also refused to trust the President. 41 Consequently, both in Gramm-Rudman's original form and in its 1987 reincarnation, an automatic sequestration procedure ensures that the budget conforms to deficit reduction targets. 4 2 This procedure makes the ongoing use of continuing resolutions a near-certainty. 43 Under this scheme, it is to the clear disadvantage of appropriations subcommittees to bring their bills forward. Because some cuts in a committee's appropriation may be necessitated as the committee struggles to meet deficit reduction goals in subcommittee, Gramm-Rudman sequestration may function as an additional penalty for timely action. As David Obey, chairman of an appropriations subcommittee, explained on the House :floor:
I warn you, even though people will give us these pious pronouncements now supporting 13 individual appropriations bills, so long as Gramm-Rudman is on the books there is an incentive for every committee around here not to bring their bill out to floor, because even if they cut their own bill and meet the spending limitations required under a budget resolution, that does not guarantee that every other committee will perform, and so they can wind up having their bill cut twice. 44 Waiting is sensible also because economic projections that determine the size of any budget reduction may improve and therefore minimize the size of cuts or negate them altogether.
The current system therefore encourages last minute action. 45 The FY 88 continuing resolution exemplifies both the best and the worst features of omnibus legislation. 47 On the downside, effective deliberation was undermined by limitations on debate and amendment and by severe restrictions on opportunities to review the resolution's conference report. Moreover, a massive amount of unrelated legislation was attached to the bill. .On the other hand, in light of competing interests within Congress and the executive's policy preferences, an omnibus measure was necessary to reach a compromise. Because it can paint with broad strokes, the continuing resolution yields a more "palatable" legislative work-product.
I. Limitations on Deliberation and Legislative Provisions.
The threat of an imminent shutdown of the federal government that makes continuing resolutions "must pass" legislation also gives rise to numerous irregularities in the enactment of such measures. House and Senate consideration of the FY 88 continuing resolution exemplifies this problem.
The process by which the measure was to be handled in the House was a substantial bone of contention, particularly for minority Members.48 Enactment of the so-called "CR Rule" 49 limited general debate to one hour and placed extreme limits both on the number of amendments and on debates concerning those amendments. 50 50. Three amendments were considered to have been approved upon adoption of the rule: (1) an exemption for members of Congress from the pay increase for federal employees; (2) a prohibition ments could be considered for adoption, and these amendments were "not amendable except as specified in the report and [were] not subject to a demand for a division of the question." 51 The subject-matter and time restrictions on these amendments included: 1) two versions of an amendment to delay imposition of sanctions under the Clear Air Act (30 minutes of debate each); 2) the fairness doctrine (30 minutes of debate); 3) prohibiting assistance to Haiti (30 minutes of debate); 4) prohibiting funds from being used to have Japanese contractors on public works or public building jobs (30 minutes of debate). 52 In light of the significance of these amendmentS, the time restrictions seem remarkable.
Needless to say, there was considerable opposition to the CR Rule. As Congressman Lawrence Coughlin remarked: " [W] ith the rule just adopted we have effectively refused to consider spending reductions but have ensured ... a full platter of other legislative initiatives that should be considered separately and on their merits .... "5 3 Further, as revealed by the following statement by Congressman Silvio Conte, some Members opposed the inclusion of new legislation: · What especially troubles me, is that the continuing resolution also contains reference to three bills ... that have not previously been before the House. In this resolution, there will be no opportuuity for amendments to those three bills-just one vote, up or down, on some of the most controversial issues in the Federal budget. 54 The Senate, unencumbered by the CR Rule, 55 considered seventyseven amendments to the bill. Senate amendments ranged from the obscure-permitting Southwest Airways to provide service between Love Field, Texas and Witchita, Kansas-56 to the monumental-Contra of transportation regulation calling for foreign repair stations for U.S. airlines; and (3) a provision stating that amounts provided for defense and nondefense domestic spending could be adjusted to accord with the outcome of the budget summit. In order to meet their objective of streamlining and expediting the process, the Senators unanimously agreed to a series of devices that enabled them to consider all seventy-seven amendments in one day. 59 Mter Senate and House action, the bill went into conference, where House and Senate Appropriations Committee members resolved differences between Congress and the White House. 60 The critical battles at the conference stage involved Contra aid and the fairness doctrine. The President insisted that he would sign the bill only after the inclusion of Contra aid and the exclusion of the fairness doctrine. 61 By standing firm on both matters, the President prevailed. 62 The President also used his Conferees also negotiated a ban on smoking on domestic flights of two hours or less, 66 a plan to allow states to raise the speed limit on rural highways to 65 miles per hour, 67 an extension of the Clean Air Act, 6 8 and a limitation rider (introduced in conference) prohibiting the FCC from modifying its cross-ownership regulations. 69 Finally, House· conferees agreed to put off discussion on farm subsidies and Senate amendments concerning Medicare payments. 70 In short, to keep the government funded for another year, a handful of conferees settled a wide spectrum of policy issues in eight days.
The final product included $603.9 billion in appropriations and was more than 2100 pages long (comprising a 1057-page bill and a 1053-page conference report). Completed at 10:45 p.m. on December 22, "[t]he bill was lugged in boxes to the House floor first, and then to the Senate. " 71 Within five hours, the Senate and the House agreed to the measure. 72 In light of these time constraints, Members-despite the massive changes made to the bill in conference-did not have an opportunity to read the bill. The President signed the bill the following morning.
The Need for Compromise.
Policymaking without the benefit of review by authorizing committees with appropriate subject-matter expertise, displacement of critical fiscal policy issues by substantive policy concerns, extraordinary limitations on legislative debate and amendment, and the conferral of enormous power on conferees suggest that the FY 88 continuing resolution is at least undemocratic and may well represent created by sending the President a $500 billion-plus continuing resolution and saying "take it or leave it." 133 CoNG. REc. at Sl5,584. On the other hand, this proposal-by increasing the likelihood of selective vetoes-threatens the delicate balance critical to the creation of the continuing resolution. Until the budget process is reformed, continuing resolutions-aside from being inevitable-force conferees to play the necessary leadership role that the 1974 Act divests from the President. These continuing resolutions, unfortunately, come at an enormous cost. Centralization in budgeting must be accomplished without the helter-skelter and undemocratic process that pushes omnibus continuing resolutions forward.
II. DUE PROCESS IN LAWMAKING
The idea of lawmakers voting on megalegislation without full knowledge of its content is (to say the least) disquieting. Aside from good government objections, 76 this practice pierces the post-Lochner 11 veil of legislative validity. The question remains, however, whether the Constitution mandates some minimal safeguards to ensure the trustworthiness of the legislative process.
The presumptive validity of legislative decisionmaking in the social 73. These complaints parallel criticism ofpolicymaking through limitation riders. See Devins, supra note 6, at 464-65. This so-called "budget summit" contributed to the need to enact an omnibus continuing resolution. First, since the summit did not conclude until November 20, there simply was not enough time to enact separate bills. Second, the enactment of separate bills would have encouraged the President's veto of both nonfavored legislation (for overexpenditure) and favored legislation (for underexpenditure). [Vol. 1988:389 idating legislative judgments, eschews the notion that Congress must mean what it says. 85 Why is there such a strong presumption of constitutionality? Commentators have advanced two conflicting lines of reasoning, both of which have found their way into Supreme Court decisioumaking. Under one view, lawmakers seek to further some "social good" through their enactments. 86 As Professor Michehnan describes the "social good" model, the legislature is the "forum for identifying or defining [objectives], and acting towards those ends. The process is one of mutual search through joint deliberation . . . . Moral insight, sociological understanding, and goodwill are all legislative virtues. " 87 The classic Supreme Court statement on this point is Vance v. Bradley: 88 "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."89
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Court opinions that speak of Congress as a "deliberative" 90 body and recognize that the "nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication" 91 also conform to this model. These opinions suggest that the legislature is the branch of government constitutionally best equipped to establish social objectives through law. 92 85 that-even under strict scrutiny review-Congress was empowered to set aside for minority businesses 10 percent of a local public works act program. 448 U.S. at 492 (plurality opinion). In reaching this conclusion, the Chief Justice blandly stated: "Although the Act recites no preambu-
The second view depicts the legislative process as a battle of political interest groups 93 that culminates in a "public choice." 94 This view leads Judge Posner to conclude that "it would be a mistake to require that legislation ... be reasonably related to some general social goal. The real 'justification' for most legislation is simply that it is the product of the constitutionally created political process of our society." 95 Granted, the Supreme Court's ostensible insistence on legitimate ends deviates from this model. 96 The Court's recognition that "due regard [should be accorded to] the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide,"97 however, smacks of the public choice model. Consequently, once the Court finds that there are "plausible reasons for Congress' action, [the Court's] inquiry is at an end."98
The "social good" and "public choice" models involve presumptions, i.e., that the choices made serve socially important goals and that the political process legitimizes the choices. The question whether the Constitution establishes some minimum of fair procedures in lawmaking is irrelevant to these formulations. Some commentators, most notably Laurence Tribe and Hans Linde, have urged that attention be paid to the lawmaking process. 99 Linde, in his seminal Due Process of Lawmaking article, argues that the impossibility of ascertaining legislative intent 100 necessitates the use of procedural safeguards as the sole means of ensurlacy 'findings' on the subject, we are satisfied that Congress had abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement practices .
• 100. According to Linde, "a law will push toward a goal ouly within the limits of objectives that may or may not be apparent in retrospect. Legislative declarations and legislative history cannot be relied on to reflect the actual balance of considerations that shaped the law." Linde, supra note 80, at 220. [Vol. 1988:389 ing legislative rationality. 101 Tribe, in contrast, views the examination of process as an additional judicial check on the legislative enterprise. 102
Supreme Court decisions are not particularly helpful here. The Court has demanded that Congress abide by its own rules in conducting investigations, 103 that the presence of a quorum and the vote required for passage are essential to legislative validity, 104 and that Congress must abide by constitutional specifications in unseating members. 105 But the Court has never come close to suggesting that Congress adopt procedures to ensure due deliberation in lawmaking. Indeed, in Field v. Clark, 106 the Court did not bat an eyelid when confronted with a piece of legislation that-despite signatures by the President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate-deviated from the legislation actually passed by both Houses of Congress. While recognizing that there is "no authority [to view] as a legislative act, any bill not passed by Congress," 107 the Court without hesitation held that the signatures of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate constitute a "declaration" that a bill has received "the sanction of the legislative branch of the government."1os
This constrained view of judicial authority is at once sensible and disconcerting. Take the case of the FY 88 continuing resolution: the limitations on floor debate, the proliferation of amendments in conference, the ali-or-nothing stakes of omnibus legislation, the threatened shutdown of the government, and especially the denial to most Members of Congress of access to the conferees' final work-product, all speak to the need for the judiciary to take a "hard look" at this type of legislation.109 In short, when only a handful of legislators exercise control over 102. Tribe, supra note 99, at 83 ("[T]he processes and rules that constitute the enterprise and define the roles of its participants matter quite apart from any identifiable 'end state' that is ultimately produced.").
103 At the same time, heightened judicial review is an unsatisfactory solution. Congress, whatever its faults, is the branch of government that makes laws. To find in the Constitution some demand that the lawmaking process operate either fairly or efficiently is to lay waste the basic assumption of legislative reasonableness. Challenges concerning the length of legislative debates or procedures governing legislative factfinding merely cloak the real battle over means/ends scrutiny. Presumptions applied to validate legislative means/ends determinations must therefore extend to the legislative process that defines means and ends.
Hans Linde suggests otherwise:
Of course, our lawmaking process is not about to become perfectly responsible, perfectly accountable, perfectly democratic . . . . The point is, rather, that the process everywhere is governed by rules, that these rules are purposefully made and from time to time changed, and that most of them are sufficiently concrete so that participants and observers alike will recognize when a legislative body is following the due process of lawmaking and when it is not. . Linde's insistence that Congress conform to specific constitutional requirements and internal rules seems quite reasonable. 111 His notion that due process limits internal House and Senate rules is more troublesome. The FY 88 continuing resolution exemplifies this difficulty. Undoubtedly, the legislative process ''broke down" with this enactment. Although no internal rules were violated, the fact that legislators were denied access to the final bill and other "irregularities" would presumably violate Linde's conception of due process.ll 2 Nevertheless, there is good reason to retain the presumption of institutional capacity and not utilize due process to invalidate this legislation. Ill. There are even problems h~re, however. Because the Senate Majority Leader can effectively waive all rules through a unanimous consent motion, an argnment can be made that courts should be circumspect in this area.
112. Linde, of course, would insist that, as a prerequisite to litigant standing, there be some alleged injury to "life, liberty or property." Linde, supra note 80, at 245. DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:389 First, there is the notion-a notion that in part underlies minimal rationality analysis-that Congress will fix that which is broken. 113 Presumably, bad features of legislation will be repealed and bad procedures will be amended. Events subsequent to the enactment of the FY 88 continuing resolution lend credence to this premise. Some offensive portions of the statute have been repealecl 114 and a serious effort is afoot to prevent future debacles. us Second, drawing a principled line between necessary safeguards and desirable practices seems impossible. For example, do rules limiting debate and amendment violate due process? What about ideologically skewed witness lists at hearings? What about legislation that does not originate in committee? The answers to these questions are value-laden. Due process in lawmaking therefore is only as sensible as active judicial review of all legislative decisioumaking.
In the end, we are left with the sinking feeling that legislative control over lawmaking means legislative control over both good and bad lawmaking. While the FY 88 continuing resolution approaches lawmaking that "shocks the conscience," 116 Congress seems the branch of government best equipped to correct this deficiency. Aside from insisting that Congress confonn to explicit constitutional mandates and its own procedures, the judicial role in the lawmaking process should be de minimis.
III. THE PRESIDENT'S VETO
The veto power that the Constitution gives the President is limited to discrete enactments, not portions of a bill. 117 Common sense suggests that this power is threatened by omnibus legislation. By parlaying several separate bills and a host of limitation riders into a single "bill," Congress presumably shields its decisionmaking from the Executive's scrutiny. Supporters of the item veto and critics of omnibus legislation portray the current state of affairs as a legislative power grab that is fundamentally inconsistent both with Congress's obligation to enact singlesubject legislation and with the President's veto. 118 or President Reagan's use of the veto power in the face of omnibus legislation.
A. Omnibus Legislation and the Constitution.
Article I, section 7 simply provides that every bill "shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate" and shall be "presented to the President" before it becomes law. It is preposterous to suggest that omnibus legislation runs afoul of this requirement. The words "every bill" in the presentment clause cannot be read to refer solely to singlesubject enactments. 119 Article I, section 7 specifies a process: bills must pass both chambers and be presented to the President. If the process takes place, presentment concerns are satisfied, irrespective of how much or how little the bill contains.
Furthermore, article I, section 5 grants each House the power to "determine the rules of the proceedings." This power presumably includes the authority to define the germaneness of legislative provisions. Consequently, as Professor Tribe suggests, "the President may wield his veto on the legislative product only in the form in which Congress chooses to send it to the White House: be the bill small or large, its concerns focused or diffuse, the form particular or omnibus, the President must accept or reject the entire thing, swallowing the bitter with the sweet." 120 All of this may sound rather obvious. Nevertheless, contentious debate has emerged on this question. 121 Critics of the current practice argue that "a 'bill,' in the constitutional sense should be held to be an [Vol. 1988:389 interconnected piece of legislation concerned with one or more related subjects." 122 This position is based on a combination of intuition and the improbability of the Framers foreseeing such modem creations of omnibus legislation and limitation riders.t23
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The argument behind the position proves unsatisfactory on at least two counts. First, even if the Framers did not foresee omnibus legislation, the same cannot be said of congressional control over the legislative process or the limitation of the veto power to an up-or-down decision by the President. Second, as demonstrated by Louis Fisher 124 and others, 1 25 "we have had omnibus bills from the start." 126 In fact, the first three appropriations bills passed by Congress were omnibus measures.I 27
Judicially requiring single-subject bills, moreover, is impracticable. It asks the courts to undertake an unmanagable task; determining the relatedness of bill provisions seems particularly within the domain of the legislature. For example, environmental and trade legislation, while concerning different subject areas, may affect the same industry; a reviewing court would be hard-pressed to determine whether the relatedness requirement is met by legislation that addresses both of these subject areas. More significantly, legislation is frequently the by-product of compromise. Superimposing a relatedness requirement would severely disrupt existing legislative practices.
The critics would be no better served by a mathematical device, such as limiting bill length or the number of amendments. How many amendments, for example, are "too many?" One? Four? One thousand? The bottom line is that for constitutional purposes a bill "denotes a singular piece of legislation in the form in which it was approved by Congress. difficult to glean from the Constitution. Article I, section 7 only tells us that if the President "approves" of legislation "he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it." The Constitution does not specify whether the President may appropriately exercise this power whenever he disagrees with a legislative judgment, or only in matters of significant constitutional dimension.
The presentment clause and pocket veto pmvisions pmvide some guidance on this point. These provisions reveal that at the very least the veto power encompasses the right to review congressional action that is "legislative in effect." 12 9 The pocket veto specifically provides that Congress cannot nullify the veto by preventing the President's return of legislation through adjournment.t 30 In a similar vein, the presentment clause-as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha 131 -preserves the President's veto:
[T]he President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded.1 3 2
To say that the President shall have "suitable opportunity to consider"133 congressional decisionmaking is not to say much. This broad understanding is not universally shared. Most notably, Professor Charles Black has argued that the "original understanding [was] that the veto would be used only rarely" and used mainly to defend either the Presidency itself or the Constitution. 136 Otherwise, Professor Black-pointing to the difficulty of legislative overrides of presidential vetoes 137 -feels that the veto will be transformed into a "means of systematic policy control [by the President] over the legislative branch." 138 The language and historical uses of the veto, however, run contrary to Professor Black's interpretation.
The Constitution does not limit the veto power to certain categories of presidential objections. Instead, the Constitution only obligates the President to sign those bills that he "approves." Indeed, the perception that the President would use the veto to oppose laws on policy grounds led to the Framers' adoption of a qualified veto (subject to a supermajority override) rather than an absolute veto. 139 This understanding is exemplified by statements by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. Madison claimed that the veto existed "to restrain the legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form." 140 Hamilton similarly characterized the veto as "an additional security against the enaction of improper laws." 141 This broad view of the veto power gains additional support from the historical record. Presidents Washington and Madison both vetoed legislation that they simply found unsatisfactory. 142 The early prevalence of 142. See L. FISHER, supra note 33, at 144-45. Professor Black, however, characterizes these early vetoes as bearing some connection to essential executive functions. Black, supra note 136, at 90-91. I find Louis Fisher's depiction more persuasive. More significantly, the disagreement be-policy-based vetoes is exemplified by John Tyler, who exercised his veto power so often that a frustrated Congress charged him "with the high crime and misdemeanor of withholding his assent to laws ... which involved no constitutional difficulty on his part." 143 This charge, however, was mere symbolism. The policy-based veto was already well-accepted.
Just as Congress is free to determine the contours of "a bill," the President is unrestrained in his ability to veto such bills. Whlle the cri.minal abuse of this power might constitute an impeachable offense, Congress must generally resort to its override power or the political process if it wants to curb the presidential veto.
This state of affairs is not at all troublesome. The veto power checks legislative excess; the veto override checks executive excess. 144 A meaningful veto prevents Congress from using its power to determine enforcement goals and enforcement mechanisms through legislation 145 to place the Executive at peril. On the other hand, Congress's power to make laws and override vetoes preserves legislative supremacy in lawmaking. The veto power should function as a moderating device, preserving the independence of each branch and encouraging effective lawmaking. It should also encourage dialogue and cooperation between Congress and the Executive; presumably neither branch wants a veto controversy either to precipitate conflict with the other or to undermine its version of the public good.
The existing system, of course, does not yield a perfect equipoise between executive and legislative power. The President's use of the veto power is potentially unwieldy, since Congress (through 1980) has over- [Vol. 1988:389 ridden less than seven percent ofvetoes. 146 In the early 1970s, this prospect led commentators to bemoan the "Imperial Presidency" 147 when Presidents Nixon and Ford used the veto power and the impoundment device to frustrate congressional initiatives. 148 On the other side, several political scientists have concluded that it is too costly for the President to veto major legislation. 149 Clinton Rossiter, for example, suggests that
The President often feels compelled to sign bills that are full of dubious grants and subsidies rather than risk a breakdown in the work of whole departments. While it salves his conscience and cools his anger to announce publicly that he would veto these if he could, most Congressmen have learned to pay no attention to his protests.l 50
While each of these competing views is supported by ample evidence, I suspect that the truth lies somewhere in the middle: the President vetoes legislation that he finds sufficiently offensive to justify the political price tag associated with a veto; Congress overrides vetoes when it finds its enactment sufficiently compelling to justify to pay the political price tag associated with an override (which usually requires some members of the President's party to vote against him). This formulation seems somewhat of a tautology, for it presumes that the President and Congress have sufficient free will to protect their independence through their respective use of the veto and veto overrides.
C. The Veto and Omnibus Legislation.
Omnibus legislation allegedly disturbs this delicate balance. Omnibus bills have been labeled veto-proof: by conglomerating legislative offerings in a single measure and then presenting this package to the President one day before the end of an appropriations cycle, Congress supposedly can make the veto power too painful to exercise. 
C. ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 254 (1956).
151. Correlatively, a movement is afoot among those who believe in an effective veto either to enact legislation or to amend the Constitution to provide the Executive with item-veto authority. The item veto is a horrendous idea. As Louis Fisher and I have discussed elsewhere, the item veto, among other failings, threatens the original design of legislation (whether it be single or multi-subject) and undermines congressional control over the lawmaking process. See Fisher & Devins, How/ Successfully Con the States' Item Veto JJe Transferred to the President?. 15 GEO. L.J. 159 (1986). In gress, of course, cannot legislate away the veto power. At the same time, nothing in the text of the Constitution mandates that the President's exercise of the veto power be palatable. As long as it is properly presented to the President, omnibus legislation, as ''bills" subject to the President's veto, satisfies article I, section 7's literal requirements. The question remains, however, whether omnibus continuing resolutions violate the spirit of the Constitution.
The answer is no. Although omnibus legislation changes the nature of the exchange between the White House and Congress, the veto still functions as a mediating device. For example, with respect to the FY 88 continuing resolution, the White House and Congress undertook extensive negotiations to ensure that the bill was satisfactory to both sides. 152 In the end, Congress abandoned the fairness doctrine and included Contra aid to stave off a threatened veto. 153 If anything, such legislative compromises reveal that a President who is willing to use his veto wields enormous power in such negotiations. 154 At the same time, legislative control over the lawmaking process is not undermined by omnibus measures, since only Congress can decide to enact a megabill.
To say that omnibus legislation is consistent with the veto power and the policies that underlie it is not to say that veto power concerns a recent article, Professor Glen Robinson argues that the item veto is a worthwhile experiment because a host of disincentives limit the effective exercise of the veto power. In particnlar Robinson is concerned that "public good" legislation "encumbered" by "private good" pork projects will not be vetoed because of the valuable "public" features of such legislation. Robinson, supra note 149, at 410-11; see also Clineburg, The Presidential Veto Power, 18 S.C.L. REv. 732, 737 (1966) (Veto power, in part, is designed for the President's "use against legislation that would serve provincial interests at the expense of the national interest."). This view presupposes that the President is better equipped than Congress to ascertain the national interest and that the costs of undermining legislative compromise are worthwhile. Robinson, moreover, makes the curious argument that the item veto will not aggrandize executive power because practical constraints will limit the President's use of the item veto. Robinson, supra note 149, at417, 418;see also Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice-Foreword, 74 VA. L. REv. 167, 172 (1988) (Pork-barrel projects allow "even the poorest regions of America to feel that they can get to the table where goodies are distributed" which lessens "regional resentment and suspicion of the national legislature."). The size of the bill did not offend hhu at all. Instead, the complaints came from legislators who were forced to act within a short time on a bill no one could possibly grasp. More than 250 members worked in 58 sub-conferences to produce the measure. Programs were cut without hearings and with little time for floor debate or amendment. The reconciliation bill became a freight train, racing through at high speeds, subject only to an up-ordown vote. The omnibus nature of the bill was championed by the White House and presidential supporters as the ouly way to make cuts in popular programs.
Fisher, supra note 43, at 103. DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1988:389 would not be better served by narrower legislation. Because it contains a host of measures that otherwise would function as independent enactments, omnibus legislation is necessarily high-stakes legislation. The stakes make Congress and the President willing to make concessions that they would not ordinarily make on single-subject bills. In FY 88, for example, both sides compromised to ensure enactment. Although it is often sensible to compromise, omnibus legislation limits the opportunity both for Congress to push its legislative agenda forward (since it will make concessions to avoid a veto) and for the President to check legislative excess (since he too will compromise to avoid having to use his veto).
Although the changing function of the veto in an era of megabills is a phenomenon worthy of careful study, the altered process does not necessarily yield a deficient legislative work-product.
IV. THE OBLIGATION TO ABIDE BY THE CONSTITUTION REVISITED: RUPERT MURDOCH VS. THE FCC
In my earlier article, I spoke briefly of instances when Congressthrough the appropriations process-has enacted legislation that directed the Executive to act in a manner forbidden by the Constitution. In distinguishing National Citizen's Comm., News America claimed that the availability of waivers-undermined here by the "no extension" language-was a critical element of the Court's holding. See Brief for Appellant at 39. The correctness of this claim is irrelevant to the case at hand. First, the freeze on the cross-ownership prohibition is only relevant insofar as the FCC is also prohibited from extending the News America waiver. Consequently, the validity of the "no extension" language remains the critical question. Second, since limitation riders are best understood as singleyear appropriations measures, the underlying FCC regulation upheld by the Supreme Court remains intact. See Devins, supra note 6, at 461-62. The FCC made this point claiming that, "[i]n essence, temporary waivers" apply to the New York Post and Boston Herald, both owned by Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch's publishing firm (News America) claimed that this provision violated the equal protection guarantee and amounted to a bill of attainder. 158 The D.C. Circuit agreed with Murdoch's claim that the "no extensions" rider was too limited in effect and struck down the provision.ts9
The prohibition against bills of attainder reflects ''the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as [the judiciary] to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons." 160 As a result, congressional acts that punish an identifiable person or persons are unconstitutional. Punishment, however, is not the mere imposition of ''burdensome consequences."161 Rather, punishment comprises historical statutory punishment, penalties that evince malicious legislative intent, or burdens that are simply too severe to be consistent with nonpunitive legislative purposes. 162 
88-1037).
158. Murdoch also argued that the continuing resolution violated: (1) the first amendment because it was motivated by a desire to censor News America's views, Brieffor Appellant at 19-22, and (2) the FCC's right to control the manner in which it administers its responsibilities, id. at 27-30. As to the second argument, the FCC-by viewing the "no extension" language as a iegislative "ban on the extension of temporary waivers" -characterized the rider as a substantive amendment within Congress's lawmaking power. Corrected Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 43. The FCC argued, however, that the "no extension" language cannot stand as a temporary restraining measure, for that "kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws . . [Vol. 1988:389 The equal protection guarantee likewise protects against overly narrow classifications and improper motives. Equality demands that likes be treated alike. Governmental action that affects only a narrow class is problematic; it may unnecessarily impose burdens or extend benefits. As Justice Jackson recognized in Railway Express v. New York: 163 [N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow ... officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus escape the political retribution that might be vested upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.I64
Traditional equal protection analysis, however, pays little attention to these concerns. Unless illegitimate purpose is shown, the presumption of legislative reasonableness empowers lawmakers to cast a narrow net. Yet, when a fundamental right (such as speech) is involved, specificity concerns loom much larger. In these fundamental rights equal protection cases, traditional deference is not accorded; instead, government must demonstrate the reasonableness of its actions.I 65
Appropriations are a likely target for specificity-based challenges.1 66 The single-year nature of appropriations narrows such measures' affected field and thereby suggests pernicious legislative intent, especially when a bill works to the disadvantage of an identifiable group. The "no extensions" rider at issue in News America illustrates the thin line that separates "legitimate" policy-based riders from unconstitutional government action.
Specificity proved to be the critical concern in News America. Murdoch made the common sense argument that because Congress knew he was the only "current recipient" to whom a temporary waiver could be extended, the "no extensions" language was written with him in mind.I 67 According to Murdoch, "[i]f the draftsmen had intended to encompass any newspaper owner other than News America ... they would have deleted the word 'current' or inserted the word 'future' in the continuing resolution." 168 The FCC responded that Congress's "current recipient" limitation is irrelevant, because the continuing resolution's limited life 163 cycle makes it imposssible to grant extensions to entities that have not already received a temporary waiver. 169 Because Congress is concerned with the use of temporary waivers to frustrate the cross-ownership prohibition,170 the FCC argued, Murdoch is a ''legitimate class of one." 171
The FCC's and News America's arguments both misconstrued the "typical" and "atypical" aspects of appropriations. News America undermined its case because, as the FCC recognized, News America's version of acceptable "general" language would have the same impact as the challenged provision. News America thus neglected to consider the "atypical" aspect of appropriations, i.e., their one-year duration. The FCC, on the other hand, erred in failing to consider the "typical" aspect of appropriations, i.e., that appropriations are statutes. The fact that the continuing resolution expired on September 30, 1988, does not mean that Congress could not have enacted general legislation prohibiting consecutive temporary waivers. Instead, by enacting a statute of limited duration, Congress chose a legislative device whose impact could only be felt by a single entity. The failings of FCC and News America both point to the same conclusion, however: the "no extensions" provision triggers the specificity concern associated with bills of attainder and fundamentalrights-type equal protection.
The decision in News America is sensitive to these concerns. Emphasizing that "only" News America could not "seek an extension during the fiscal year," 172 the D.C. Circuit concluded that the no extensions rider poorly served Congress's purported goal of preserving the crossownership prohibition. Since any other entity remained eligible for a temporary extension, the court found the rider grossly underinclusive. 173 To protect the cross-ownership rule, the FCC should treat initial grants of temporary extensions and extension renewals alike.
The court undertook this demanding means/ ends analysis because 425, 472 (1977) . In Nixon, the Court concluded that it was appropriate for the legislation to address only Mr. Nixon's record because when the law was enacted, "only his materials demanded i=ediate attention." Id. The Act did, however, establish a special commission to reco=end legislation for the preservation of future Presidents' records. This "wider net" ostensibly convinced the Court that the legislation was of a general character. Id.
172. News America, 844 F.2d at 814. 173. As the News America court put it, "every publisher in the country other than Murdoch can knock on the FCC's door and seek the exercise of its discretion to secure ... a period of exemption from the cross-ownership restrictions." Id. Yet, since a temporary waiver could only be available to Murdoch, no other publisher was "similarly situated" to News America during the rider's life cycle. [Vol. 1988:389 fundamental speech rights were involved in the case. 475-76 (1977) ). If legislation "falls within the historical meaning oflegislative punishment," it too will be struck down as an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Id. Legislative punishment comprises imprisonment, banishment, punitive confiscation of property, and legislative bars to employment Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474-75. Murdoch claimed that " [t] he Continuing Resolution has, in effect, imposed a multi-million dollar fine upon News America by reducing its ability to sell the New York Post at a reasonable price." Brief for Appellant at 26 n.7, News America (No. 88-1037). Claiming that there is no right to an administrative hearing, the FCC argued that Congress has plenary authority to eliminate a procedural ability to seck extensions of waivers, and that any such congressional action.~ do not violate the bill of attainder prohibition. Corrected Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 38-39. The FCC has the better argument. Laws that cause economic disadvantag~ are not necessarily legislative punishment, for the bill of attainder clause "does not •.. limit[ ] Congress to the choice oflegislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471.
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The "reasonableness" inquiry also limits bill of attainder actions. ''Reasonableness" means that there arc "legitimate justifications for passage of the Act." I d. at 476. The fact that more general legislation could have been crafted is irrelevant In Nixon, the Court did not find the legislation's uncertain impact on future Presidents problematic. See supra note 171. Here, the fact that the "no extensions" measure can ouly apply to Murdoch does not necessarily mean that it is punitive. With respect to repeated temporary extensions undermining the cross-ownership prohibition, Murdochfor the time being-is a class of one. Congress's concern over the cross-ownership rule is also reftected in its general prohibition of FCC reconsideration of the rule. See supra note 157. Finally, although bill of attainder concerns are heightened when Congress legislates through the appropriations process, the difficulty of enacting more general substantive legislation may be a partial explanation for this phenomenon. See generally Devins, supra note 6, at 464. [Vol. 1988:389 Determining these statements' significance is problematic. 186 First, the Supreme Court has frequently stated that it is "normally hesitant to attach much weight to comments made after the passage of legislation."187 In the News America situation, however, the comments were made by the rider's sponsors only a month after the rider's passage 188 and are the only available evidence of legislative intent. Second, even if considered probative, isolated hostile statements "do not constitute 'the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which ... is required before a congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down' [under the bill of attainder clause]." 189 In view of some of the statements of nonpunitive purpose made in support of the "no extensions" rider, News America did not adequately demonstrate that it was singled out for punishment. But since these statements of neutral purpose are irrelevant in the case of an appropriation of limited duration, 190 hostile statements by legislative sponsors take on added weight. In short, the atypical feature of appropriations-their limited duration-complicates the search for the general purposes of legislation that can only affect a narrow class during its life cycle.
Because temporary extensions of the cross-ownership rule last eighteen months, the parties to be affected by the annual reenactment of the "no extensions" rider are necessarily known to Congress. This fact is troublesome. On the one hand, Congress should be able to define the contours of the cross-ownership rule so long as the rule means the same thing to similarly situated publishers. On the other hand, the limited duration of the "no extensions" rider raises the specter of selective enforcement of the cross-ownership rule based on legislative tastes. In the end, while appropriations riders may not violate the bill of attainder clause, the image of governmental fairness and neutrality is undermined by such short-term enactments. Appropriations are one-year statutes that can cause identifiable groups to suffer relative harms. Limitation riders that alter or freeze executive rulemaking schemes therefore can raise both specificity and intent-to-punish concerns. Because Congress cannot effectively debate riders included in last-minute continuing resolutions, 1 9 1 limitation riders included in such measures give the appearance of a legislative star chamber inflicting secretive, unconditional punishment. Congress, to cure this defect, should-to the extent practicable192-make policy by enacting authorizations of general applicability. CONCLUSION This article has been something of a whirlwind tour of legal and practical problems raised by continuing resolutions. The bottom line is that Congress should disfavor continuing resolutions. While the broad scope of recent continuing resolutions allows congressional leaders to make necessary comprolnises across the range of government spending issues, the continuing resolution funding device is undemocratic and therefore comes at too high a price. Moreover, continuing resolutions disrupt the balance of power between Congress and the President, and dispel the essential fiction of fair governance.
The confluence of Gramm-Rudman and 1974 Budget Act procedures, unfortunately, makes the continued use of this funding device all too likely. To eliminate existing incentives for omnibus resolutions, Congress must reexamine the federal budget process itself. ·
191. Limitation riders enacted in regular appropriations are often subject to contentious debate.
See Devins, supra note 6, at 464-65.
192. On occasion, limitation riders may be the only legislative means available to Congress to further its policymaking agenda. See id.
